Ephren Taylor, II, the former CEO of City Capital Corporation, was convicted in 2014 for orchestrating a large Ponzi scheme targeting Black and Christian communities. Taylor filed an initial pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and subsequent Rule 59(e) motion; almost three years later, the district court denied both.
While that denial was under appeal, Taylor filed additional motions seeking to reopen, supplement, and amend his habeas proceedings. The district court denied these later motions as unauthorized under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), holding they were “second or successive” to the already-adjudicated § 2255 petition and that Taylor had not secured appellate authorization.
The Eleventh Circuit’s analysis on appeal closely following recent Supreme Court precedent in Rivers v. Guerrero, 605 U.S. 443 (2025), which clarified that once a district court enters final judgment denying an initial habeas petition on the merits, any subsequent habeas filing generally qualifies as “second or successive.” In that case, the Court did not decide on whether the classification of a second-in-time petition must occur while the appeal is pending.
Here, the panel found that Taylor’s later filings were unauthorized second or successive motions attempting to advance new habeas claims after the District Court provided a merits judgment that already analyzed all the original § 2255 claims. The panel further held the record showed no basis for treating the district court’s limited remand to address a COA as vesting jurisdiction to consider additional habeas matters.
Turning to Taylor’s motion to modify the conditions of his supervised release, under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2), the panel held that district courts may not use such motions to address the legality or constitutionality of conditions. Instead, they must consider those issues on direct appeal or via an initial § 2255 motion.
The court did agree with Taylor, however, that the District Court erred in denying his motion to modify the terms of his supervised release without considering the § 3553(a) factors. Accordingly, the Court vacated and remanded for further proceedings on that limited issue.
Appeal from the Northern District of Georgia.
Opinion by Ruiz, joined by J. Pryor and Wilson.