Supreme Court Opinions

In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court reversed denial of a defendant’s motion to change venue. The defendant was charged in federal court in California with falsifying a document with intent to obstruct a federal investigation under 18 U.S.C. § 1519. The defendant had created and provided a false invoice to FBI agents interviewing him in his home in Seattle, and the agents discovered the invoice was false upon returning to San Fransisco. The Court held that the offense was completed in Seattle and rejected arguments that venue was proper based on the intended effects or actual effect on the investigation.

In a 5-4 opinion, the Court held that the defendant was entitled to habeas relief based on a jury selection issue under Batson v. Kentucky. The trial court did not allow the defense to argue that the prosecutor’s “race-neutral” explanations for striking 4 of 5 black jurors were pre-textual (the “third step” of the Batson analysis), and the state appellate courts erroneously held that the defense had failed to preserve that issue.

The Supreme Court held that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not violated by a judge’s order that he and his attorney not discuss his ongoing testimony during a 24-hour recess at trial. The Court compared Geders v. United States, which prohibited a complete overnight ban on attorney-client consultation, and Perry v. Leeke, which permitted limited restrictions during a brief mid-testimony recess, and upheld narrow restrictions prohibiting a defendant and his attorneys from managing his ongoing testimony, while recognizing that a defendant may still discuss trial strategy with their attorney, other witnesses or evidence, evidentiary rulings, plea negotiations, sentencing, and other matters, even when those discussions incidentally involve the testimony already given.

In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court held that restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) is a criminal penalty subject to the Ex Post Facto Clause, and the defendant had improperly been ordered to pay restitution because his offense predated the MVRA. The Court reasoned that the text and structure of the MVRA labels restitution a “penalty,” permits an order only after a criminal conviction, imposes restitution at sentencing alongside imprisonment and fines, and uses procedures applicable to criminal penalties.

The Supreme Court held that a defendant may not be convicted under both 18 USC 924(c) and 18 USC 924(j), which provides separate penalties when a 924(c) conviction causes death), based on a single act involving a firearm.

In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court upheld a Terry stop of a defendant’s vehicle after officers approached the vehicle, two passengers fled the vehicle, and the driver began backing the car away after. The Court held that, in considering the totality of the circumstances, courts may not isolate individual facts, identify innocent explanations for each fact, and then remove them from consideration.

In a unanimous opinion, the Court upheld a warrantless entry into a defendant’s home, where officers found him with a gun and later charged him with assaulting an officer. The Court upheld the warrantless entry under the “emergency aid” exception to the warrant requirement, as the officers had an objectively reasonable basis that the defendant-occupant was seriously injured or imminently threatened serious injury. The defendant’s ex-girlfriend told police that he had threatened to kill himself, and officers arriving at his house received no answer and observed empty beer cans, an empty holster, and an apparent suicide note through the window.

In a 5-4 opinion, the Supreme Court held that law enforcement obtaining Google “Location History” data amounts to a “search” under the Fourth Amendment, thus requiring a warrant. The Court held that law enforcement invades a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy when it seeks data that precisely tracks the person’s movements, similar to the cell-site location data in Carpenter v. United States. In this armed bank robbery case, police obtained a “geofence” warrant that allowed them to obtain location data for all devices near the bank at the time of the robbery and then employ a multi-step process to narrow the devices and obtain identifying information for their users. The Court remanded for the Fourth Circuit to determine whether the warrant met the particularity and probable cause requirements, including in executing the later steps, and whether the good faith exception applies.

The Supreme Court has granted review in a cluster of cases that go directly to core federal criminal issues: Hemani (Second Amendment limits on § 922(g)(3) “drug user” cases), Barrett (how far prosecutors can stack § 924(c) and § 924(j) firearm penalties), Ellingburg (whether MVRA restitution is “punishment” for Ex Post Facto purposes), and Villarreal (Sixth Amendment limits on barring attorney-client consultation during trial recesses). The Court also agreed to hear Noem v. Al Otro Lado, which addresses asylum “metering” at the border and could influence how “entry” and presence are defined in illegal entry, reentry, and smuggling prosecutions.

In a 5-4 opinion, the Supreme Court held that the First Step Act’s reduced penalties for § 924(c) offenses apply at a defendant’s resentencing when the defendant’s prior sentence has been vacated. The Court reasoned that a vacated sentence is a sentence that “has not been imposed” within the meaning of § 403(b).