The Sixth Circuit held that defendants convicted under 924(c) and involved in resentencing proceedings on remand must be sentenced subject to the First Step Act’s amendments to 924(c).

The Fourth Circuit held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery, like conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, does not constitute a “crime of violence” under 924(c) because under the categorical approach an attempt to commit the offense does not invariably require use of force or threat of force.

The Eleventh Circuit vacated six defendants’ sentences because their RICO conspiracy convictions did not qualify as violent crimes under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The Court also held that one of the defendant’s sentences was unreasonable.

The Eleventh Circuit rejected a number of the defendant’s challenges and affirmed his conviction for Hobbs Act robbery, holding among other things that defendant’s robbery of a store was sufficient to “affect” interstate commerce and that no commercial relationship was required between the victim and defendant. The Court also upheld the defendant’s 7 and 25-year sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), holding that changes to the mandatory minimum did not apply retroactively to cases pending on direct appeal. The Court also held there was no due process violation in the Government’s use of a photo array; no Rule 403 abuse of discretion permitting video evidence; no Eighth Amendment violation when sentences were well below statutory maximums; and sentences were not substantively unreasonable when all relevant facts were considered and weighed.

The Ninth Circuit reversed one of the defendant’s assault convictions and corresponding § 924(c) convictions as multiplicitous because the defendant, although charged with shooting at five officers, only shot at them four times. The Court also held that multiple shots fired in quick succession do not necessarily mean the firearm was only used once under 924(c).

The Court affirmed the defendant’s convictions and sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). While the First Step Act was enacted while the defendant’s appeal was pending, the Court held that its provisions on mandatory minimums did apply retroactively to cases pending on direct appeal.

The Court affirmed the defendant’s convictions for enticing a minor under § 2422(b) but reversed his conviction under § 373 for solicitation to commit a crime of violence, holding that kidnapping under § 1201(a) is not a “crime of violence” under the categorical approach applicable to § 373. The Court also held that the defendant’s right to a complete defense was not violated by the trial court’s proper rulings on the inadmissibility of the defense experts’ testimony.

The Court affirmed the district court’s denial of the defendant’s second § 2255 motion, holding that the defendant’s federal second-degree murder offenses, based on pointing a firearm at boat passengers and throwing them overboard, was a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)’s residual and elements clause.

The Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction for carrying a firearm in furtherance of a drug crime under § 924(c), holding that there was sufficient evidence of the nexus between the firearm and drug trafficking given the firearm’s proximity to the drugs and proceeds, its accessibility, and the government’s evidence that drug traffickers frequently use firearms in connection with drug offenses.

The Court affirmed the denial of a defendant’s second § 2255 motion which alleged that the defendant’s conviction under the residual clause of § 924(c) was unconstitutional. The Court held that the defendant’s motion was not based on a “new rule of constitutional law” given this Court’s holdings in Ovalles II and In Re: Garrett.