Recent Circuit Cases

The First Circuit vacated a defendant’s conviction for attempted coercion and enticement of a minor. The Court held that the trial court erred in excluding certain expert testimony from a clinical psychologist. While the trial court had allowed the witness to testify as an expert in the field of internet sexual behaviors, it erred in prohibiting the witness from opining on the defendant’s internet chats and whether chats like his met the pattern shown by child predators who communicate with minors online.

The First Circuit vacated the sentence of a former police officer convicted of RICO conspiracy. The Court held that the district court erred in considering the PSR’s mere mentioning of the defendant’s prior administrative complaints, without more to substantiate them, as a basis for an upwards variance from the Guidelines.

The Fourth Circuit vacated a defendant’s convictions for committing a crime of violence while failing to register as a sex offender. The Government dismissed other charges against the defendant and allowed him to plead guilty to one charge conditionally so he could appeal whether his underlying kidnapping offense was a “crime of violence,” and after an intervening opinion held that kidnapping isn’t, the Court held that the district court erred in allowing the Government to reinstate the original charges against the defendant since the Government was still bound by its prior plea agreement.

The Fourth Circuit vacated a defendant’s conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The Court held that the defendant met his burden of showing a Rehaif error where there was evidence that he did not know he was a felon given that he was sentenced to 6 months probation for possession of cocaine under South Carolina and the record showed he genuinely did not know he was a felon.

The Sixth Circuit vacated a defendant’s sentence that had been enhanced under 21 USC 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) based on his prior convictions. The Court held that the defendant’s meth conviction under Kentucky state law was not a “serious drug offense” or “serious drug felony” since his statute of conviction encompassed more than manufacturing conduct.

The Eighth Circuit vacated a district court’s restitution order after finding that the Government breached the plea agreement by advocating for a higher amount than previously stipulated. The Court entertained the defendant’s claim despite an appellate waiver, holding that the Government’s breach seriously affected the fairness of the proceedings.

The Second Circuit affirmed a district court’s order acquitting a defendant of violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, holding that the defendant, who worked for a U.K. subsidiary of a U.S. company involved in bribing Indonesian officials, was not an “agent” or employee” of the U.S. company under common law. The Court also held that the defendant’s speedy trial rights were not violated by a 6-year delay and that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on withdrawal from a conspiracy and proving venue in a case involving money transfers through multiple states.

The Eighth Circuit reversed a district court’s order denying the Government’s motion to dismiss several charges in an indictment against a defendant pursuant to a plea agreement and the defendant’s guilty plea to the least serious charge. After finding that it jurisdiction under the collateral-order doctrine, the Court held that the district court erred in finding that dismissal of the remaining charges was “clearly contrary to manifest public interest” and had improperly substituted its own judgment for the prosecution’s.

The Tenth Circuit reversed a district court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained after his backpack was searched by agents following his arrest on a Greyhound bus. While the agents had probable cause to arrest him and seize the backpack, they did not have the authority to search the contents of his bag without a warrant, and the plain view doctrine did not apply where the agent was rummaging around the insides of the backpack “in an exploratory manner.”

Joining seven other circuits, the Second Circuit held that Hobbs Act robbery is not a “crime of violence” under the Guidelines for Career Offender, USSG 4B1.2(a), because the offense can be applied to conduct involving only violence against property, not against other people. The Court also upheld the district court’s finding that Application Note 1 to 4B1.2, which states that conspiracy to commit a crime of violence is a “crime of violence,” was not binding because the note is inconsistent with the text of 4B1.2 itself, which does not include conspiracy as one of the predicate offenses for career offender.