The Court affirmed the defendant's sentence under the ACCA, holding that a Florida conviction for aiding and abetting an armed robbery counts as a “violent felony” for purposes of sentencing a defendant under the ACCA since an aider and abettor is liable as a principal under Florida law.
The Supreme Court struck down the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which criminalizes carrying a firearm in connection with a “crime of violence” or drug trafficking crime, as unconstitutionally vague. The decision was based on prior Supreme Court decisions striking down similar provisions defining "crimes of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16 and the ACCA.
The Supreme Court unanimously held that the defendant’s 2002 Michigan conviction for third-degree home invasion was a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act’s enumerated-offenses clause, as the Michigan offense “substantially corresponded to” or was narrower than generic burglary under the categorical approach from Taylor v. United States.
The Court vacated the defendant’s sentence after holding that a prior conviction under Georgia’s aggravated assault statute is not a “crime of violence” under the ACCA or Federal Sentencing Guidelines when the conviction is based on a simple assault with a mens rea of recklessness.
The Court affirmed the defendant’s sentence after holding that defendant’s prior second-degree murder conviction was a “violent felony” under the ACCA’s elements clause.