Among other rulings on other issues, the Court reversed the defendant's conviction for bankruptcy fraud, holding that the income from his second religious temple, opened after the first temple filed a petition for bankruptcy and providing the same services as the first temple, did not constitute post-petition property of the first temple's estate since the temples otherwise operated as two separate entities and the government did not try to pierce the corporate veil.
The Court affirmed the defendant's convictions for wire fraud, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting proposed jury instructions that distinguished a "scheme to defraud" from a "scheme to deceive," since the proposed instructions did not also include language defining an intent to harm based on a misrepresentation of the nature of the bargain.
The Court reversed the defendant's conviction for aggravated identity theft, holding that the defendant did not "use" his patient's identifying information when he fraudulent billed Medicare for services he never provided them, since he did not use their identifying information for the purposes of passing himself off as another person.
The Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction for possessing unauthorized access devices affecting interstate commerce, holding that the district court retained jurisdiction despite the guilty plea lacking a factual basis explaining how the defendant’s conduct affected interstate commerce. A district court’s jurisdiction is invoked by an indictment sufficiently alleging a federal offense, while an offense’s “jurisdictional element” only reflects Congress’s power to regulate or prohibit the conduct at issue.
The Court held there was sufficient evidence to convict the defendants of identify theft and mail fraud. The Court also rejected the argument that the defendants received ineffective assistance from conflicted counsel after the defendants filed bar complaints against them. The Court held that the defendants failed to show that their attorneys had a conflict of interest, let alone were ineffective, since “the state-bar grievances did not create conflicting obligations” and thus did not put the attorneys in a position to have to choose one interest over another.
