Supervised Release

The Seventh Circuit vacated a defendant’s above-Guidelines prison sentence imposed upon his violation of supervised release. The Court concluded that the record showed the sentencing judge had improperly sentenced Shaw to prison for the purpose of rehabilitation, which is explicitly prohibited under 18 USC 3582(a).

The Tenth Circuit reversed a district court’s denial of two motions for early termination of probation, which the district judge had denied on the grounds that the defendants had not been sentenced to any prison time. The Tenth Circuit held that nothing in the statute or case law supports an assertion that probation-only sentences must be treated differently for termination, and courts may not make decisions about whether to grant early termination based on a blanket personal policy and must instead consider the statutory factors as they apply to each individual.

The Seventh Circuit reversed a trial court’s bond revocation. The Court held, for the first time, that the standard of review for a revocation decision is an independent review with due deference to a trial court’s findings of fact. The Court held that the trial court here failed to make explicit findings by clear and convincing evidence or sufficiently state why detention was necessary under the circumstances.

The Third Circuit held that the district court had plainly erred in imposing a condition of supervised release requiring the defendant to register as a sex offender under SORNA where the defendant did not have a conviction for a “sex offense” under SORNA’s definitions. The defendant was convicted of depriving the civil rights of individuals under color of law by using his position as a police officer to coerce women to engage in sexual conduct with him. The Court also held that since he was not notified of SORNA’s requirements prior to his sentencing, his appellate waiver was not entered into knowingly and voluntarily.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district court’s order requiring a sex offender on supervised release to notify prospective clients of his sex offender status. The Court held this was not an impermissible modification of his supervised release conditions since his initial conditions allowed probation to require the defendant to notify certain third parties of his status.

The Seventh Circuit reversed a district court’s revocation of the defendant’s supervised release and 6-month sentence. Reviewing the district court’s decision under the Court’s “supervisory power,” the Court held that the district court did not adequately address the defendant’s explanation for his non-criminal, unintentional violations, and it did not properly explain its sentencing decision in accordance with the 3553(a) factors.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed a defendant’s conviction and sentence. The Court held that the prosecutor did not commit plain error during closing arguments when they incorrectly stated that the defendant had stipulated his guilt as to one of the counts in the indictment, as opposed to just one element of that count, reasoning that the full context allowed the jury to infer the stipulation only applied to an element of the count. The Court also held that, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s decision in Packingham v. North Carolina, a defendant’s condition of supervised release prohibiting internet access except for work and pre-approved purposes is not unconstitutional even if the defendant’s term of supervised release is for life.

The Third Circuit vacated a district court order denying a defendant early termination of supervised release, holding that the district court applied the wrong legal standard when it found the defendant had not established changed, unforeseen, or exceptional reasons warranting early termination. A district court has broad authority and discretion to terminate a term of supervised release “if it is satisfied that such action is warranted by the conduct of the defendant released and the interest of justice.” 

The Fifth Circuit vacated special conditions of a defendant’s supervised release and remanded for resentencing holding that an absolute ban on computer use or internet access for ten years after serving a 12.5-year sentence was plain error. The Court held that the condition was overbroad because it was not narrowly tailored by scope or duration and would preclude defendant from participating meaningfully in modern society for long periods of time due to the ubiquitous nature and importance of the Internet.

The Second Circuit vacated a defendant’s supervised release condition and remanded for resentencing holding that a condition of release prohibiting him from online speech promoting or endorsing violence was unconstitutionally vague and violated defendant’s right to free speech under the First Amendment. The Court held that language in the condition defining “violence” included open-ended language allowing the condition to be applied without limits.