Appellate Procedure

In an 8-1 decision (with multiple concurrences), the Supreme Court held that the appeal waiver in a defendant’s written plea agreement was not necessarily enforceable if enforcement would “produce a miscarriage of justice.” While that standard is narrow, the Court remanded the case for the Fifth Circuit to determine whether the appeal waiver was enforceable against an appeal of the sentencing court’s decision to impose a mandatory-medication condition of supervised release.

In a 5-4 opinion, the Court held that the defendant was entitled to habeas relief based on a jury selection issue under Batson v. Kentucky. The trial court did not allow the defense to argue that the prosecutor’s “race-neutral” explanations for striking 4 of 5 black jurors were pre-textual (the “third step” of the Batson analysis), and the state appellate courts erroneously held that the defense had failed to preserve that issue.

In a 5-4 opinion, the Supreme Court held that the First Step Act’s reduced penalties for § 924(c) offenses apply at a defendant’s resentencing when the defendant’s prior sentence has been vacated. The Court reasoned that a vacated sentence is a sentence that “has not been imposed” within the meaning of § 403(b).

In a case involving the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine, wherein a federal court will not consider a defendant’s petition for review of a state-court conviction unless state law is inadequate for review, a 5-4 majority held that a capital defendant denial of post-conviction relief under Arizona state law was not foreclosed from federal review. The Court held that the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision that an intervening U.S. Supreme Court opinion was not a “significant change in law” presented an exceptional case because the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision rested “on such a novel and unforeseeable interpretation of a state court procedural rule that the decision is not adequate to foreclose review of the federal claim.” The Court’s decision may broaden federal jurisdiction to consider post-conviction petitions involving questions of state law, which are normally precluded from being raised in federal court.

The Fourth Circuit vacated a defendant’s convictions for committing a crime of violence while failing to register as a sex offender. The Government dismissed other charges against the defendant and allowed him to plead guilty to one charge conditionally so he could appeal whether his underlying kidnapping offense was a “crime of violence,” and after an intervening opinion held that kidnapping isn’t, the Court held that the district court erred in allowing the Government to reinstate the original charges against the defendant since the Government was still bound by its prior plea agreement.

The Fourth Circuit vacated a defendant’s conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The Court held that the defendant met his burden of showing a Rehaif error where there was evidence that he did not know he was a felon given that he was sentenced to 6 months probation for possession of cocaine under South Carolina and the record showed he genuinely did not know he was a felon.

The Eighth Circuit vacated a district court’s restitution order after finding that the Government breached the plea agreement by advocating for a higher amount than previously stipulated. The Court entertained the defendant’s claim despite an appellate waiver, holding that the Government’s breach seriously affected the fairness of the proceedings.

The Eighth Circuit reversed a district court’s order denying the Government’s motion to dismiss several charges in an indictment against a defendant pursuant to a plea agreement and the defendant’s guilty plea to the least serious charge. After finding that it jurisdiction under the collateral-order doctrine, the Court held that the district court erred in finding that dismissal of the remaining charges was “clearly contrary to manifest public interest” and had improperly substituted its own judgment for the prosecution’s.

The Third Circuit held that, in cases where a defendant is sentenced under the prior version of 924(c) but has their sentence vacated on constitutional grounds, the amended version of 924(c) is in effect at any later resentencing.

In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court held that a federal court reviewing a state court’s denial of a habeas petition must apply the standards set forth under AEDPA and the Supreme Court’s holding in Brecht v. Abrahamson, where the Court held that a state prisoner must show that an error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence” on his trial. AEDPA, on the other hand, sets forth a standard that is more difficult to meet–the state prisoner must show that the state court’s judgment was “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application” of “clearly established federal law.”

Accordingly, state prisoners challenging their convictions in federal court will not only have to show error or ineffective assistance of counsel at the trial level and error at the appellate level, they will also have to show prejudice under Brecht and that the appellate courts that affirmed the judgment did contrary to, or in an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.