Illinois’s Concealed Carry Act forbids carrying firearms on public transit, with exceptions for unloaded or properly stored guns. Three licensed carriers sued for declaratory relief, alleging the ban violates the Second Amendment. The district court granted them summary judgment.
Applying Bruen’s text-history framework, the Seventh Circuit reversed. It concluded that the transit ban fits within a centuries-old tradition of restricting arms in sensitive, crowded, and confined places such as schools, courthouses, and legislative assemblies. The court also emphasized characteristics of the places being regulated that support application of the “sensitive places doctrine,” such as the density of the space, the presence of vulnerable populations (namely, children), the furthering of important societal interests, and government control of the space. Notably, too, the court treated 19th-century firearm restrictions by private railroad companies as corroborative evidence to its history and tradition analysis and noted that reasoning about sensitive places parallels how courts treat location-specific restrictions in First Amendment doctrine.
Accordingly, the court reversed the district court’s summary judgment for plaintiffs and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Judge St. Eve agreed fully but wrote separately on redressability nuances where overlapping laws exist.
Appeal from the Northern District of Illinois.
Opinion by Kolar joined by Ripple and St. Eve. Concurring opinion by St. Eve.