Circuit Court Opinions

The Court affirmed the defendant’s convictions and sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). While the First Step Act was enacted while the defendant’s appeal was pending, the Court held that its provisions on mandatory minimums did apply retroactively to cases pending on direct appeal.

The Court affirmed the defendant’s reduced sentence under the First Step Act where the sentencing court sentenced the defendant to time served, and not less time than he had already served, in order to prevent the defendant from “banking” the excess time and applying it in a potential future revocation of his supervise release.

The Court affirmed the defendant’s sentence as procedurally reasonable. The sentencing court did not err by considering the defendant’s false testimony under the 3553 factors despite not finding that she obstructed justice under USSG 3C1.1.

The Court affirmed the defendant’s sentence, holding that the defendant’s prior conviction for loitering under Pennsylvania law was not “loitering” or an “offense similar to” loitering under the Guidelines because the Pennsylvania offense requires proving criminal intent.

The Court held that the defendant’s consent for an undercover officer to enter his house was not tainted by “police deception.” While the officer did not identify himself as law enforcement to the defendant when he asked to talk to the defendant’s wife and to step inside “to get out of the cold,” the officer did not take any affirmative acts to conceal his identity from the defendant. The Court also held that Wooden’s burglary convictions under Georgia law qualified as crimes of violence under the ACCA.

The Court affirmed the denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress, holding that fingerprints obtained as a result of an unlawful arrest should not be excluded under the routine booking exception to the Fourth Amendment.

Despite the significant amount of discretion granted to sentencing courts, the Court held that the district court’s downward variance of 80% from a Guidelines range of 85 years in prison to 17 years in prison was substantively unreasonable based on the Court of Appeals finding that the district court improperly second-guessed the defendant’s state of mind, created an unwarranted disparity between the defendants, and placed too much weight on mitigating factors.

The Court held that the sentencing court committed plain and reversible error when it relied on the defendant’s “bare arrest record” in determining a sentence, as the sentencing court had only cited the Defendant’s “extensive criminal history” without adequately distinguishing between adjudications, convictions, and mere arrests. 

The Court held that the defendant could not be removed and later charged with illegal reentry based on a conviction under California law that was broader in defining methamphetamine than the federal law defining methamphetamine.

The Court found that there was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant for bribery based on evidence that he took money from an undercover agent to perform an official act, even though the defendant lacked the actual ability to exert the promised influence necessary to perform the official act. The Court explained that the Government does not have to prove that a bribery defendant actually has the ability to achieve the promised outcome since the crime of bribery is based on the agreement, not the outcome.