Fourth Amendment

The Court affirmed the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress based on a federal search warrant that was based on a defective state warrant. Though the Court agreed with the defendant that “any probable cause deficiency with the state search warrant would, as a matter of law and logic on these facts, heavily inform any conclusion we reach about the sufficiency of probable cause in the federal warrant application,” the Court upheld denial of the motion to suppress since the federal agents acted in good faith when they relied on the state warrant. The Court held that the focus should have been on the federal agents, who had no reason to question the integrity of the state proceedings, though the Court acknowledged that the result may have been different if the record reflected that the FBI had more knowledge about the state court proceedings

The Court held that a warrant obtained after an illegal entry was an independent legal source for the drug evidence where the warrant application was supported by probable cause without the tainted information, and the Government’s decision to seek the warrant was not motivated by the illegal entry, despite inconsistent testimony from the agent at the suppression hearing and the agents’ decision to confirm the presence of methamphetamine before seeking a warrant. 

The Court held that suppression was not warranted where the defendant waived his Miranda rights, despite officers allowing him to take valium to avoid withdrawals, where there was other evidence indicating he was lucid, and where the defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his apartment upon signing a Written Consent.

The Court held that there was no reasonable suspicion to detain a defendant who fled upon being approached by police as there is no per se rule that says flight creates reasonable suspicion, the officers never ordered the defendant to stop before activating their lights, and there was no threat of harm or indication that the defendant was acting in any dangerous manner or that the area was dangerous.

The Court held that a knock-and-talk violation does not mandate suppression when a valid search warrant exists and the knock-and-announce violation has “nothing to do with the seizure of the evidence.” Here, the warrant was valid, and officers would have executed it and seized the evidence regardless of the alleged violation.

Regardless of any alleged failure to execute a search warrant within the time limit in violation of Rule 41, absent any other “constitutional infirmity,” suppression is unwarranted unless the defendant is prejudiced or if officers recklessly disregard the proper procedure. The defendant was not prejudiced here since probable cause continued to exist after the time limit.

In a marijuana farm case, the Court held that law enforcement did not exceed the scope of a permissible knock-and-talk when they returned to the defendant’s house with other narcotics officers after smelling marijuana at the property earlier in the day, as an officer’s subjective intent is irrelevant. The Court also affirmed the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss the marijuana charges based on the Obama-era “Cole memo” directing prosecutors not to prosecute marijuana cases in states where marijuana is legal.

The Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction for a DUI after police took his blood while he was passed out, with a plurality of the  Court holding that conducting a blood test on a defendant while he is passed out is permissible under the “exigent circumstance” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.

The Court held that a police officer did not exceed the scope of a permissible Terry frisk by reaching into the defendant’s pocket and seizing ammunition and a holster after feeling the bullet during the frisk. Under the totality of circumstances, going into the defendant’s pocket and removing ammunition was reasonably related to the protection of law enforcement.

The Court affirmed the defendants’ convictions, holding, among other things, that there was probable cause to justify warrantless search of the defendant’s vehicle where officers could tie the vehicle to identity fraud, the defendant’s repeated use of an access device to obtain benefits reflected knowledge that the access device belonged to a real person, the government was allowed to use a detective as an expert witness on common slang terms in identity fraud cases, and the district court properly applied a firearm enhancement.