After violating his conditions of supervised release, the district court revoked petitioner Joseph Esteras’ supervised release and sentenced him to additional prison time pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3583. The court’s sentence was driven largely by the “retribution” factor under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), which mandates that the sentence imposed must “reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and provide just punishment for the offense.”
On appeal, Esteras argued that § 3583(e), which lists the factors a court may consider in supervised release revocation proceedings, explicitly prohibits the consideration of the retribution factor in revoking supervised release. The Sixth Circuit disagreed and affirmed, creating a circuit split between the Sixth, First, Second, and Third Circuits and the other federal circuits holding that the retribution factor cannot be considered in revocation proceedings.
The Supreme Court reversed, resolving the circuit split. Justice Barrett, writing for the Court, held that a district court may not consider retribution as defined under § 3553(a)(2)(A) when considering whether to revoke a defendant’s term of supervised release. The Court reasoned under an expressio unius argument: § 3583(e), which governs revocation, authorizes courts to impose imprisonment only after considering a subset of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors—the nature of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. The statute explicitly leaves out 3553(a)(2)(A).
Justice Sotomayor agreed but wrote separately to emphasize that when a court considers whether a supervised-release violation warrants revocation and reimprisonment, it must look only to the forward-looking ends mentioned in the statute, rather than the backward-looking end of retribution. Justice Jackson also agreed with the holding but chastised the majority for unnecessarily addressing the scope of “offense” in Part II-B. Justice Alito wrote in dissent, arguing that sentencing courts should retain discretion to consider retribution, and that § 3583(e)’s omission of § 3553(a)(2)(A) does not prohibit judges from considering it.
Certiorari to the Ninth Circuit
Opinion by Barrett, joined by Roberts, Thomas, Kagan, and Kavanaugh, and joined in part by Sotomayor and Jackson
Opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment by Sotomayor, joined by Jackson
Opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment by Jackson
Dissenting opinion by Alito, joined by Gorsuch
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