Leahy, a white man, was convicted after using his car to terrorize a Black family by repeatedly attempting to run them off a public road, yelling racial slurs, and confronting the victim (J.T.) in person while making racially charged threats. Upon arrest, Leahy made explicitly racist statements to police and equated the presence of Black people in “his” area with disorder. Leahy was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B), which prohibits racially motivated force or threats interfering with the enjoyment of facilities administered by a state or local government.
On appeal, Leahy principally argued that Congress lacked authority under the Thirteenth Amendment to enact § 245(b)(2)(B). Leahy asked the court to consider whether Congress rationally determined that violent interference with the use of a public road because of race constitutes a badge or incident of slavery per Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. “This is an easy one,” the court said. “We hold that Congress did.” The court found historical and legislative evidence established that racially motivated interference with travel on public roads is a classic badge of slavery, as slave codes and post-war Black Codes restricted the mobility of Black people through violence and intimidation. In doing so, the panel rejected Leahy’s invitation to apply the narrower standard of the Civil Rights Cases, which Jones would not permit.
Next, the court rejected Leahy’s argument that § 245(b)(2)(B) required proof of a defendant’s specific intent to prevent or dissuade the victim from using a public facility. Instead, the Court held that “because of” in the statute adopts a “but-for” causation standard, requiring only evidence that the defendant would not have acted except for the victim using the public facility, not proof of a specific motive or purpose to prevent use of the facility. The district court’s jury instructions, utilizing the but-for standard, were therefore correct. The panel further concluded that the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give Leahy’s proposed “theory of defense” instruction or in refusing to directly answer a jury question that effectively asked the court to weigh evidence.
Addressing sufficiency, the panel found that the trial record, including Leahy’s explicit admissions and the targeting of the victim on a public road because of his race, supported a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Leahy’s conduct was motivated by J.T.’s race and use of Starkey Road. The denial of Leahy’s Rule 29 and Rule 33 motions was affirmed.
Judge Rosenbaum, joined by Judge Abudu, filed a concurrence discussing the historical and textual roots of Congress’s authority under the Thirteenth Amendment and defending the continuing validity of the Jones framework.
Appeal from the Middle District of Florida.
Opinion by Rosenbaum, joined by Newsom and Abudu. Concurring opinion by Rosenbaum, joined by Abudu.