Police investigating an armed bank robbery obtained a “geofence” search warrant for Google’s “Location History” data from all electronic devices located within a 150-meter radius of the bank around the time of the robbery. The warrant used a three-step process that began with anonymized Location History data from all the relevant devices and ultimately allowed officers to obtain identifying information for a narrowed group of users identified with certain devices, including petitioner Okello Chatrie.
Chatrie moved to suppress the location data, arguing that obtaining it constituted a Fourth Amendment search and that the warrant lacked probable cause and particularity. The district court concluded that the warrant violated the Fourth Amendment but denied suppression under the good-faith exception.
A divided Fourth Circuit panel affirmed on different grounds, holding that Chatrie lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the Location History data. The Fourth Circuit later affirmed en banc by an equally divided vote.
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded. Justice Kagan, writing for a five-Justice majority, held that law enforcement conducts a Fourth Amendment search when it obtains an individual’s Google Location History. The Court reasoned that the data provides a highly precise record of a person’s physical movements and implicates the same privacy concerns identified in Carpenter v. United States. Neither the short duration of the requested data nor Google’s possession of it eliminated Chatrie’s reasonable expectation of privacy. The majority opinion employs broad language regarding emerging technology and the government’s increasing ability to track and surveil the public.
The Supreme Court did not decide whether the geofence warrant itself satisfied the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Circuit had not resolved whether each stage of the warrant satisfied probable cause and particularity or whether the good faith exception applies. The Court remanded those questions for further proceedings. The critical ruling, however, is that acquisition of Google Location History and similar data, triggers Fourth Amendment protection without categorically invalidating geofence warrants.
Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Sotomayor, concurred and would have gone further, concluding that at least the second and third stages of the warrant failed probable-cause and particularity requirements.
Justice Gorsuch concurred in the judgment but criticized the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy framework under Katz v. United States, arguing for a property-based approach to interpreting the Fourth Amendment. His concurrence characterized Chatrie’s Location History as part of his papers and “effects.”
Justice Alito dissented, arguing that the Court improperly expanded Carpenter and otherwise should have resolved the case under the good-faith exception. Justice Barrett separately dissented, concluding that Chatrie had no reasonable expectation of privacy in location data concerning public movements that he voluntarily disclosed to Google.
Certiorari to the Fourth Circuit
Opinion by Kagan, joined by Roberts, Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, and Jackson
Concurring opinion by Jackson, joined by Sotomayor
Opinion concurring in the judgment by Gorsuch
Dissenting opinion by Alito, joined in part by Thomas and Barrett
Dissenting opinion by Barrett
Click here to read the opinion.