Eleventh Circuit

The Eleventh Circuit held Ephren Taylor’s pro-se habeas motions were unauthorized “second or successive” under the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Rivers v. Guerrero, rejecting his bid to reopen § 2255 claims.

This case raises the question: When does the “felon-in-possession” statute not apply to felons? The Eleventh Circuit held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) applies only to prior felonies punishable by over one year of actual imprisonment, not probation or other consequences, and it vacated the defendant’s conviction for an Alabama Class D felony where the defendant was not subject to any actual prison time based on his specific circumstances. While the statute of conviction authorized over a year of prison for some defendants in certain cases, the panel held that courts considering a prior conviction under 922(g)(1) must apply a “defendant-specific” interpretation and not an “offense-specific” one.

In a rare challenge to Congress’s power under Thirteenth Amendment, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the conviction of Jordan Leahy under 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B) for racially motivated violent interference with another’s use of a public road. The Court held that § 245(b)(2)(B) is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s authority under the Thirteenth Amendment, and rejected challenges to the jury instructions, the handling of jury questions, and the sufficiency of the evidence. Here, there was amply evidence that the defendant was motivated by the victim’s race and use of the road.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed convictions arising from a check-cashing and mail-theft scheme, rejected a Dubin challenge to the defendant’s conviction for aggravated identity theft, vacated the “sophisticated means” enhancement for lack of defendant-specific conduct, and vacated restitution tied to the defendant’s pre-participation conduct.

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of a civil complaint brought by a group of medical marijuana users in Florida challenging 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), which prohibits firearm possession by unlawful users of controlled substances. The Court held that the Government had not established that disarming state-lawful medical marijuana users is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulations under Bruen.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district court’s denial of a defendant’s motion under 28 USC 2255. The Court held that the defendant’s motion was properly waived based on his plea agreement, notwithstanding changes in the law that undermined his conviction under 924(c), holding that the waiver exception for sentences over the statutory maximum is based on the maximum “in effect at the time of sentencing,” and not the maximum based on subsequent new laws.

The Eleventh Circuit reversed a district court’s partial denial of a defendant’s motion to vacate under 2255 and vacated the defendant’s convictions for tax fraud and tax evasion. The Court held that the defendant’s counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a judgment of acquittal where the Government’s evidence showed that the defendant hid gold bullion, no evidence that it was his gold.

Alfonzo Lewis was convicted of drug offenses and challenged his arrest, jury selection, and other aspects of his trial on appeal. Lewis had initially been investigated by a federal drug task force that included state and local agents. After agents witnessed him leaving a house after a drug transaction, local law enforcement conducted a traffic […]

The Eleventh Circuit held that a driver of a rental vehicle has standing to challenge a traffic stop and inventory search even if they were driving with a suspended license and they are not an authorized driver on the rental agreement.

The Eleventh Circuit vacated a defendant’s sentence that had been enhanced under the ACCA after the district court held that the defendant’s prior conviction was a “serious drug offense.” However, the statute under which the defendant was previously convicted under state law also prohibited ioflupane, which was not a controlled substance at the time of the defendant’s federal prosecution. Citing fair notice and due process concerns, the Court concluded that sentencing courts must “apply the version of the Controlled Substance Act Schedules in place when the defendant committed the federal firearm-possession offense for which he is being sentenced,” as opposed to the schedules in effect when the defendant is convicted of his predicate state offenses.