Second Circuit

The Second Circuit affirmed a district court’s order acquitting a defendant of violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, holding that the defendant, who worked for a U.K. subsidiary of a U.S. company involved in bribing Indonesian officials, was not an “agent” or employee” of the U.S. company under common law. The Court also held that the defendant’s speedy trial rights were not violated by a 6-year delay and that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on withdrawal from a conspiracy and proving venue in a case involving money transfers through multiple states.

Joining seven other circuits, the Second Circuit held that Hobbs Act robbery is not a “crime of violence” under the Guidelines for Career Offender, USSG 4B1.2(a), because the offense can be applied to conduct involving only violence against property, not against other people. The Court also upheld the district court’s finding that Application Note 1 to 4B1.2, which states that conspiracy to commit a crime of violence is a “crime of violence,” was not binding because the note is inconsistent with the text of 4B1.2 itself, which does not include conspiracy as one of the predicate offenses for career offender.

The Second Circuit reversed a defendant’s conviction after holding that the district court should have granted the defendant’s motions to dismiss, which were based on the government’s violation of his right to a speedy trial. The Government caused a delay of over three and a half years, and the district court erroneously excluded time from the speedy trial calculations merely because the case was “complex,” which was insufficient.

The Second Circuit held that a district court considering a motion for compassionate release can reduce a defendant’s sentence or release them notwithstanding that the defendant was sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment. The Court affirmed denial of the defendant’s motion, however, since the district court did not base its denial on the defendant’s mandatory minimum sentence and otherwise did not abuse its discretion.

The Second Circuit affirmed a district court’s order denying the defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea. The defendant had argued that the district court misstated the applicable mandatory minimum term of supervised release. The Second Circuit affirmed but noted the parties had incorrectly stated that the defendant bore the burden of persuasion to show the Rule 11 error had affected his substantial rights. Rather, it was the Government’s burden to show such an error was harmless.

The Second Circuit vacated a $2.3 million restitution order against a defendant convicted of securities fraud. The Court held that most of the alleged victims’ losses came from purchasing shares of a sham company outside of a public market, in a private placement. Since the private placement was arranged by the defendant’s co-conspirators and there was no evidence that the defendant was involved in planning or executing the private placement, the defendant could not be held accountable for those losses as the proximate or direct cause.

The Second Circuit vacated a defendant’s conviction for distributing fentanyl. The Court held that the defendant only has to present “some credible evidence” regarding government inducement in order to obtain an instruction on entrapment. The Government’s law enforcement witness also improperly testified that the defendant was an experienced drug dealer, which required specialized knowledge.

The Second Circuit remanded a case to give the defendants an opportunity to file post-conviction motions based on the Government’s alleged violation of Brady v. Maryland. The Court vacated a protective order previously obtained ex parte by the DOJ, disclosed the documents to the defense as new evidence, and remanded for the district court to determine if a new trial was warranted.

Sitting en banc, the Second Circuit held that first degree manslaughter under New York law is categorically a “crime of violence” under the ACCA and the Career Offender provision of the Guidelines. Despite the fact that the offense can be committed through omission or inaction, as opposed to only through act of force or threat of force, the Court concluded it fit the bill under the force clauses of the ACCA because it required a victim’s death and a defendant’s intent to cause at least serious bodily injury.

The Second Circuit affirmed the convictions of three men who had recruited college basketball players to certain universities by giving their families secret cash payments and then lying to the NCAA about it. The Court held that the elements of wire fraud were met because, through the defendants’ misrepresentations, they had deprived the universities of scholarship money paid to the college athletes that could have gone to eligible athletes that did not receive cash payments.