Guilty Pleas

In a plea-agreement appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the rejection of a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) agreement but held that the district court abused its discretion in subsequently rejecting a charge bargain plea agreement, citing deference to prosecutorial charging discretion.

The Fourth Circuit vacated a defendant’s convictions for committing a crime of violence while failing to register as a sex offender. The Government dismissed other charges against the defendant and allowed him to plead guilty to one charge conditionally so he could appeal whether his underlying kidnapping offense was a “crime of violence,” and after an intervening opinion held that kidnapping isn’t, the Court held that the district court erred in allowing the Government to reinstate the original charges against the defendant since the Government was still bound by its prior plea agreement.

The Fourth Circuit vacated a defendant’s conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The Court held that the defendant met his burden of showing a Rehaif error where there was evidence that he did not know he was a felon given that he was sentenced to 6 months probation for possession of cocaine under South Carolina and the record showed he genuinely did not know he was a felon.

The Eighth Circuit vacated a district court’s restitution order after finding that the Government breached the plea agreement by advocating for a higher amount than previously stipulated. The Court entertained the defendant’s claim despite an appellate waiver, holding that the Government’s breach seriously affected the fairness of the proceedings.

The Eighth Circuit reversed a district court’s order denying the Government’s motion to dismiss several charges in an indictment against a defendant pursuant to a plea agreement and the defendant’s guilty plea to the least serious charge. After finding that it jurisdiction under the collateral-order doctrine, the Court held that the district court erred in finding that dismissal of the remaining charges was “clearly contrary to manifest public interest” and had improperly substituted its own judgment for the prosecution’s.

The Seventh Circuit reversed a defendant’s conviction for drug conspiracy after holding that the defendant’s guilty plea was not voluntary. At the change of plea hearing, the defendant had disputed the quantity of drugs imputed to him in the Government’s factual basis and indicated he did not understand the elements of conspiracy as opposed to his substantive drug charge.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed a defendant’s sentence after the Government appealed the district court’s downward variance from the parties’ binding Rule 11(c)(1)(c) plea agreement. The Court held that Rule 11 gives the defendant the right to withdraw a 11(c)(1)(C) plea if the court rejects it but does not give the Government the right to withdraw its consent in the same scenario.

The Tenth Circuit vacated a defendant’s sentence and remanded for re-sentencing after the district court imposed a higher sentence based on the defendant’s decision to plead guilty without a plea agreement with the Government. The Court concluded that a defendant’s decision whether to enter an “open plea” does not fall under one of the factors listed in 18 USC 3553, and it was therefore procedurally unreasonable for the judge to consider that fact in imposing a higher sentence.

The Second Circuit affirmed a district court’s order denying the defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea. The defendant had argued that the district court misstated the applicable mandatory minimum term of supervised release. The Second Circuit affirmed but noted the parties had incorrectly stated that the defendant bore the burden of persuasion to show the Rule 11 error had affected his substantial rights. Rather, it was the Government’s burden to show such an error was harmless.

The Eighth Circuit vacated a defendant’s sentence and held that the judge improperly participated in plea negotiations when he excused the prosecutor from the court room, told the defendant that the federal system “sucks” and is “really harsh,” and suggested that the defendant would be sentenced by a more lenient if he went to trial and lost rather than plead guilty. The Court held this was reversible plain error where the defendant proceeded to trial and received a higher sentence than discussed by the parties and the judge at the change of plea hearing.