Recent Circuit Cases

Limiting the discretion district courts have grant motions for compassionate release or sentence reductions, the Sixth Circuit held that a district court cannot base a finding of “extraordinary and compelling reasons” on non-retroactive changes in the law or facts that existed when the defendant was sentenced, even taken together.

The First Circuit vacated a defendant’s sentence for maintaining a drug involved premises. The Court held that the district court erred in applying the higher offense level under USSG 2D1.8(a) because there was insufficient evidence that the defendant had participated in the underlying drug offense beyond providing her apartment to her boyfriend as a place to sell and store drugs. The fact that she knew about his drug activities and accompanied him on some of his trips to resupply, standing alone, were not enough to show she participated.

The First Circuit vacated a defendant’s sentence for possession of a firearm by an unlawful drug user. The Court held that the district court committed plain error where it varied upwards from the defendant’s Guidelines range based on the fact that the defendant possessed a machine gun and its concerns with violent crimes in Puerto Rico. The Court held that the type of firearm possessed was already covered by the Guidelines, and thus could not be the basis for an upwards variance, and the district court failed to tie its concerns with crime in Puerto Rico to this specific defendant’s conduct.

The First Circuit vacated a defendant’s sentence for possession of a machine gun. Reviewing for procedural reasonableness, the Court held that the district court failed to adequately explain its basis for its 12-month upwards variance and that the only reason cited by the court, the fact that the machine gun was dangerous, was already covered by the Guidelines and thus an improper basis for the variance.

The Fourth Circuit reversed convictions for several defendants convicted of RICO, VICAR, and carrying a firearm during crimes of violence. In a complex opinion, the Court held that RICO conspiracy is a divisible offense requiring the modified categorical approach to determine if the offense is a crime of violence. The Court concluded that a RICO conspiracy, even an “aggravated” one, is not a crime of violence under 924(c). The Court also reversed the defendants’ VICAR convictions where the jury instructions referred to the wrong state law. Finally, the Court reversed one of the VICAR and 924(c) counts predicated on attempted murder where the defendants only took a preparatory act, not an overt act, in driving around looking for the victim.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed a defendant’s conviction for possession of a firearm by a nonimmigrant visa holder. The Court held that there was sufficient evidence that the defendant knew his visa possessed the characteristics of a non-immigrant visa where it explicitly authorized a temporary stay for work purposes.

The Sixth Circuit vacated a defendant’s sentence based on the sentencing court’s impermissible double counting when calculating the guidelines range. The defendant was subject to enhancements for causing injuries while fleeing a bank robbery, but the court erred in applying these enhancements to other, unrelated bank robberies.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed a defendant’s conviction under 18 USC 922(g)(4) for possession of a firearm by a person previously committed to a mental institution. The Court held that the defendant’s conviction did not require evidence that his prior commitment was based on a finding that he was dangerous, and the Court rejected his constitutional challenge to 922(g)(4) after applying intermediate scrutiny and holding that his Second Amendment rights were not impermissibly restricted.

Sitting en banc, the Eleventh Circuit reversed prior precedents regarding the “Inevitable Discovery Doctrine” and held that, to preclude suppression of unlawfully obtained evidence, the Government must show by a “preponderance of the evidence” that law enforcement would have ultimately discovered the evidence through lawful means anyway. In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit abandoned the “reasonable probability” standard.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of a defendant’s motion for a sentence reduction under Section 404(b) of the First Step Act, but held that a defendant serving time for a revocation of supervised release is eligible to move for a reduction under Section 404(b) as long as the original offense underlying the supervised release was a “covered offense” under the Fair Sentencing Act.