Recent Circuit Cases

The Tenth Circuit reversed a district court’s dismissal of attempted bank robbery charges under 18 USC 2113 where the district court found that the defendant’s attempt to hold up two victims at gunpoint and force them to withdraw money from an ATM did not amount to an attempted “bank robbery” since the defendant would be robbing them, not the bank. Deepening a circuit split between the Fifth Circuit and Seventh Circuit, the Tenth Circuit reversed, concluding that “using force to induce a bank customer to withdraw money from an ATM is federal bank robbery.”

In an immigration appeal that likely affects federal criminal cases, the Eleventh Circuit held that a petitioner’s prior state law conviction for possession of marijuana did not constitute an offense involving a “controlled substance” as defined under federal law. The Court noted that the definition of marijuana under federal law, while still classifying marijuana as a controlled substance, excludes cannabis that falls under the definition of “hemp.” The petitioner’s conviction was under a Florida law that did not make that distinction and thus would ostensibly allow for a conviction based on possession of hemp. Accordingly, the petitioner’s prior offense was not a categorical match with the federal definition of a controlled substance offense.

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to vacate their sentence under 28 USC 2255. The Court held that the district court erred in instructing the jury on aiding and abetting in an unlawful possession of a firearm case where the government did not present any evidence that the defendant knew his co-defendant was prohibited from possessing firearms. The Court also held that Rehaif is retroactive to cases on collateral review and discussed the standard for procedural default under 2255 at length.

The Third Circuit reversed a defendant’s conviction for distributing drugs within 1,000 feet of a playground under 21 USC 841, where the trial court did not instruct the jury in how to define a “playground” as defined under 21 USC 861(e)(1). The Court concluded that whether the facility is a playground is an element of the offense that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, joining the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits.

The Eighth Circuit reversed some, but not all, of a defendant’s convictions for multiple counts of wire fraud where, after depositing embezzled funds from his church, the defendant-priest made several payments from that account using those funds. The Court upheld the defendant’s convictions based on the deposits since they furthered the scheme but reversed those based on the payments, since those payments did not help further or conceal the offense.

Sitting en banc, the Ninth Circuit held that federal second degree murder (18 USC 1111(a)) is a “crime of violence” under 18 USC 924(c) where, employing the categorical approach, a conviction requires acting “deliberately or recklessly with extreme disregard for human life.” The Ninth Circuit distinguished reckless disregard for human life from mere recklessness but otherwise emphasized that “anything less than intentional conduct does not qualify as a crime of violence.”

The Ninth Circuit vacated defendants’ sentences for fraud, which had been enhanced by 20 levels under USSG 2B1.1 based on the loss resulting from the closure of a bank due to defendants’ offenses. The Court held that, where an enhancement has “an extremely disproportionate effect on the sentence,” the underlying facts must be shown by “clear and convincing evidence.” Here, it was not clear and convincing that defendants had caused the bank to collapse.

The First Circuit vacated a defendant’s 46-month sentence for various firearm offenses, holding that the district court erred in finding that the defendant was an “unlawful drug user” at the time of his offense. The enhancement was based on the defendant’s statement to probation, during the drafting of his PSR, that he smoked marijuana daily in the years leading up to his arrest. The Court held that this statement failed to establish the temporal nexus for the defendant’s drug use and his possession of a firearm, especially since the defendant had also told probation that he sometimes went “weeks” without smoking marijuana, and thus the district court clearly erred in relying on it for the enhancement.

The First Circuit held that the district court did not err in enforcing a DEA subpoena to New Hampshire’s Prescription Drug Monitoring Program (PDMP), holding that 1) a subpoena does not amount to a lawsuit against a state and thus does not violate its sovereignty, and 2) people do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their prescription drug records given the closely regulated industry doctrine.

The Sixth Circuit vacated a defendant’s sentence and remanded for new trial on the limited issue of whether he was within the “chain of distribution” of the drugs that resulted in the victims’ deaths.