Sentencing

The Eighth Circuit vacated a defendant’s sentence for distributing methamphetamine based on the sentencing court improperly calculating the defendant’s drug quantity. The Court held that drugs found in the defendant’s girlfriend’s car should not have been included in the defendant’s total drug quantity where the additional quantity was based solely on a stipulation in the plea agreement that the girlfriend had made certain statements about the drugs. The stipulation did not establish that her statements were true, and there was no additional evidence tying the defendant to the drugs.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the sentence of a defendant after the sentencing court declined to grant the defendant a downward departure under USSG 5G1.3 based on his time served on a state sentence for relevant conduct. The Court reasoned that Booker rendered all Guidelines advisory, including 5G1.3. Judge W. Pryor dissented, arguing that 5G1.3 was binding notwithstanding Booker, since the Guideline did not address the sentencing range but rather the kinds of sentences a judge can impose. The opinion was also contrary to prior panel precedent in US v. Knight.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s application of the 2-point enhancement for possessing a firearm or dangerous weapon during a drug offense. Although the Government conceded at sentencing that it could not meet its burden and the defendant objected to the enhancement, the Court held that the district court, not the parties, apply the guidelines, and there was sufficient evidence to apply the enhancement here where the defendant’s rifle was found in a “very small trailer,” where the defendant sold and kept drugs, and the rifle was in “very close proximity” to the drugs.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed a defendant’s 360-month sentence for producing child pornography after the defendant pleaded to engaging in a sexual relationship with a 16-year old girl and posting pictures of them having intercourse together. The Court held that 1) the enhancement for material depicting masochistic, sadistic, or violent conduct applied based on an image of the defendant choking the victim during sex, and 2) the 5-point enhancement for a “pattern of activity” involving prohibited sexual conduct is not double counting because the Sentencing Commission intended for it to be cumulative to all other enhancements.

In a 9-0 decision (with J. Sotomayor concurring in the judgment), the Supreme Court held that a defendant who had been convicted for a crack-cocaine offense that did not carry a mandatory minimum did not have a conviction for a “covered offense” under the First Step Act and was thus ineligible to move for a sentence reduction. The First Step Act had the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 retroactive.

In a 5-4 opinion, the Supreme Court held that prior convictions for offenses that only require a mens rea of “recklessness” cannot serve as predicate convictions under the “elements clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act. The Court reasoned that the language requiring that an offense involved the use of force “against the person of another,” reflected that the perpetrator must act purposefully and intentionally.

The First Circuit vacated a defendant’s sentence which had been enhanced based on a 2014 conviction under state law for distributing marijuana, which the sentencing court held was a “controlled substance offense” under the Guidelines. The First Circuit held that convictions under state laws that do not distinguish between marijuana and hemp, as defined and legalized under federal law, cannot serve as “controlled substance offenses” under the Guidelines.

The Eleventh Circuit and Ninth Circuit created a circuit split concerning the proper interpretation of the safety valve under 18 USC 3553(f), particularly as it was amended by the First Step Act. The courts disagreed over the proper interpretation of the word “and” in the list of requirements a defendant must meet for their criminal history to allow them to qualify for the safety valve. The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation would allow far more defendants qualify.

The Eleventh Circuit became the first, and so far the only, circuit court to hold that district courts considering sentence reductions motions under 3582(c)(1)(A) are bound by the criteria under USSG 1B1.13. To date, seven other circuits have held that district courts have discretion to determine if an inmate has presented extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting a reduction. District courts in the Eleventh Circuit now have much less discretion to reduce an inmate’s sentence.

The U.S. Sentencing Commission has issued a “Retroactivity Data Report,” reflecting the data showing how many inmates have had their sentences reduced under the First Step Act’s retroactive sentencing provisions for crack-cocaine offenders. The data includes a break down by criminal history category, whether the offender had a firearm, and the average reduction.