Sentencing

In an appeal of a district court’s denial of a motion under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A) based on the district court’s weighing of the factors under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), the Third Circuit held that the proper standard of review is for abuse of discretion.

The Ninth Circuit vacated a defendant’s sentence because the district court erred in failing to consider whether the defendant had accepted responsibility. Though the defendant had gone to trial, he had admitted factual guilt and relied on a defense that the government lacked jurisdiction under the Hobbs Act. The Court held that a defendant may still receive credit for accepting responsibility after making good faith challenges to a statute’s applicability in a criminal case.

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the defendant’s convictions on several grounds but vacated his life sentence for drug and money laundering offenses, holding that the sentencing court failed to consider several non-frivolous arguments the defendant raised, including arguments regarding lower recidivism for older offenders, sentence disparities with co-defendants, and the defendant’s legitimate work history.

The Sixth Circuit vacated a defendant’s sentence based on insufficient evidence to support the district court’s application of the four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2A6.1(b)(4), which applies when the offense a substantial expenditure of funds to…otherwise respond to the offense. The government had not presented any specific accounting of its expenses in responding to the offense, nor had it distinguished its expenses as “substantial” as opposed to “typical.”

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the defendant’s 480-month sentence for receipt of child pornography, holding that the sentencing court properly considered hearsay statements found in case files from a prior sex offense case involving the defendant, including depositions of the victims, since the statements were supported by sufficient indicia of reliability. The Court also held the district court was not required to provide notice prior to varying upwards from the Guidelines since notice is only required prior to upward departures and the court was explicitly varying upwards and relying on the 3553 factors in doing so.

In an unpublished opinion, the Third Circuit held that it was error for the district court to require an inmate-defendant to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing a motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). Though the warden had denied the inmate’s request for compassionate release within 30 days of receiving the request, the statute allows an inmate to bring inmate may bring a motion directly to the court after 30 days elapse from the warden’s receipt of the request regardless of the warden’s response.

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a motion for sentence reduction under 18 USC 3582(c)(1)(A), holding that the district court did not err in finding that, assuming the defendant had established extraordinary and compelling reasons outside of USSG 1B1.13, his release was not warranted under the 18 USC 3553(a) factors.

The Eleventh Circuit upheld a sentencing guideline enhancement for possessing a firearm under § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) because the evidence showed that the defendant planned on selling the firearm to purchase drugs he intended to distribute.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the defendant’s sentence, holding that the district court properly estimated the loss amount based on specific, circumstantial evidence of causation, namely that the defendant’s investors relied on the defendant’s fraudulent representations, and that the court did not err in rejecting the defendant’s intervening causation theory. The Court also held that the defendant’s claims on remand before the district court where limited by the scope fo the appellate court’s mandate on remand and did not fall under any of the three exceptions.

The Ninth Circuit reversed one of the defendant’s assault convictions and corresponding § 924(c) convictions as multiplicitous because the defendant, although charged with shooting at five officers, only shot at them four times. The Court also held that multiple shots fired in quick succession do not necessarily mean the firearm was only used once under 924(c).