Sentencing

The Eleventh Circuit vacated the defendant’s sentence because the district court failed to apply a provision of the Sentencing Guidelines that would have reduced the defendant’s sentence by the amount of time served in a separate but related case, holding that the Guidelines are still binding if they do not enhance a defendant’s sentence or mandate imposition of a sentence within the Guidelines range.

The Eleventh Circuit vacated six defendants’ sentences because their RICO conspiracy convictions did not qualify as violent crimes under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The Court also held that one of the defendant’s sentences was unreasonable.

The Eleventh Circuit rejected a number of the defendant’s challenges and affirmed his conviction for Hobbs Act robbery, holding among other things that defendant’s robbery of a store was sufficient to “affect” interstate commerce and that no commercial relationship was required between the victim and defendant. The Court also upheld the defendant’s 7 and 25-year sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), holding that changes to the mandatory minimum did not apply retroactively to cases pending on direct appeal. The Court also held there was no due process violation in the Government’s use of a photo array; no Rule 403 abuse of discretion permitting video evidence; no Eighth Amendment violation when sentences were well below statutory maximums; and sentences were not substantively unreasonable when all relevant facts were considered and weighed.

President Trump has nominated five individuals, including four judges, to sit on the U.S. Sentencing Commission.The president’s picks have elicited criticism from advocates of criminal justice reform on both ends of the political spectrum, especially the president’s choice of three judges who have well-established reputations of being “tough on crime” and imposing long sentences.

In an appeal of a district court’s denial of a motion under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A) based on the district court’s weighing of the factors under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), the Third Circuit held that the proper standard of review is for abuse of discretion.

The Ninth Circuit vacated a defendant’s sentence because the district court erred in failing to consider whether the defendant had accepted responsibility. Though the defendant had gone to trial, he had admitted factual guilt and relied on a defense that the government lacked jurisdiction under the Hobbs Act. The Court held that a defendant may still receive credit for accepting responsibility after making good faith challenges to a statute’s applicability in a criminal case.

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the defendant’s convictions on several grounds but vacated his life sentence for drug and money laundering offenses, holding that the sentencing court failed to consider several non-frivolous arguments the defendant raised, including arguments regarding lower recidivism for older offenders, sentence disparities with co-defendants, and the defendant’s legitimate work history.

The Sixth Circuit vacated a defendant’s sentence based on insufficient evidence to support the district court’s application of the four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2A6.1(b)(4), which applies when the offense a substantial expenditure of funds to…otherwise respond to the offense. The government had not presented any specific accounting of its expenses in responding to the offense, nor had it distinguished its expenses as “substantial” as opposed to “typical.”

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the defendant’s 480-month sentence for receipt of child pornography, holding that the sentencing court properly considered hearsay statements found in case files from a prior sex offense case involving the defendant, including depositions of the victims, since the statements were supported by sufficient indicia of reliability. The Court also held the district court was not required to provide notice prior to varying upwards from the Guidelines since notice is only required prior to upward departures and the court was explicitly varying upwards and relying on the 3553 factors in doing so.

In an unpublished opinion, the Third Circuit held that it was error for the district court to require an inmate-defendant to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing a motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). Though the warden had denied the inmate’s request for compassionate release within 30 days of receiving the request, the statute allows an inmate to bring inmate may bring a motion directly to the court after 30 days elapse from the warden’s receipt of the request regardless of the warden’s response.