Sentencing

The Third Circuit vacated Josey’s sentence for failing to update his sex-offender registration after moving interstate, holding that the district court erred in counting defendant’s prior sentences that were imposed over ten years prior to the “commencement of the instant offense.” The court held that the district court could not rely on the commentary to the Guidelines to begin counting the 10-year period from the date of the defendant’s relevant conduct, here a separate sentence for failure to register under state law, and instead had to count the 10-year period only from the specific offense of conviction.

The Second Circuit affirmed convictions of a veterinarian and salesperson for manufacturing and distributing undetectable performance-enhancing drugs to racehorse trainers, rejecting arguments that the FDCA’s enhanced penalty provision applies only to fraud against consumers. The court also held that FDCA seizure provisions do not authorize criminal forfeiture and vacated the $25 million restitution and forfeiture orders.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed convictions arising from a check-cashing and mail-theft scheme, rejected a Dubin challenge to the defendant’s conviction for aggravated identity theft, vacated the “sophisticated means” enhancement for lack of defendant-specific conduct, and vacated restitution tied to the defendant’s pre-participation conduct.

In a sentencing appeal, the Tenth Circuit vacated a 60-month upward-variance sentence for attempted bulk-cash smuggling as substantively unreasonable, citing reliance on a material misstatement and inadequate treatment of sentencing-disparity evidence. The district court’s sentence was an outlier in light of national sentencing data and relied on a false belief that the defendant had been on bond during the offense.

In a drug-conspiracy appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction but vacated the sentence after finding the district court’s drug-quantity estimate relied on unreliable confidential-source hearsay. The court rejected a due-process challenge to an in-chambers evidentiary ruling and held any Rule 404(b) error harmless.

In a plea-agreement appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the rejection of a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) agreement but held that the district court abused its discretion in subsequently rejecting a charge bargain plea agreement, citing deference to prosecutorial charging discretion.

In a habeas appeal concerning First Step Act credits, the Ninth Circuit held that earned time credits may be applied to reduce the length of a supervised release term, reversed the district court’s dismissal, and remanded for recalculation and transmission of credits to probation.

The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2) based on the retroactive amendment under U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1. The Court held that § 6A1.3(a)’s notice-and-opportunity protections apply to § 3582(c)(2) proceedings, but there was no due-process violation because the district court relied on information used at the original sentencing, not “new information.”

The Second Circuit affirmed a jury verdict finding a medical billing company owner guilty of health care fraud, conspiracy, wire fraud, and aggravated identity theft, but vacated his 144-month sentence, $63.38 million forfeiture judgment, and $336.99 million restitution award. The Court held the district court procedurally erred by lengthening the prison term based on the prospect of First Step Act earned-time credits and RDAP benefits, misapplied two Guidelines enhancements without adequate findings, and used flawed methodologies for forfeiture and restitution.

In a 5-4 opinion, the Supreme Court held that the First Step Act’s reduced penalties for § 924(c) offenses apply at a defendant’s resentencing when the defendant’s prior sentence has been vacated. The Court reasoned that a vacated sentence is a sentence that “has not been imposed” within the meaning of § 403(b).