Circuit Court Opinions

The Ninth Circuit vacated a felon-in-possession sentence after holding that Oregon’s aggravated unlawful use of a weapon statute does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under the Guidelines.

The Eleventh Circuit held Ephren Taylor’s pro-se habeas motions were unauthorized “second or successive” under the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Rivers v. Guerrero, rejecting his bid to reopen § 2255 claims.

This case raises the question: When does the “felon-in-possession” statute not apply to felons? The Eleventh Circuit held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) applies only to prior felonies punishable by over one year of actual imprisonment, not probation or other consequences, and it vacated the defendant’s conviction for an Alabama Class D felony where the defendant was not subject to any actual prison time based on his specific circumstances. While the statute of conviction authorized over a year of prison for some defendants in certain cases, the panel held that courts considering a prior conviction under 922(g)(1) must apply a “defendant-specific” interpretation and not an “offense-specific” one.

In a tax fraud conspiracy appeal, the Tenth Circuit vacated the defendant’s § 371 conviction where the district court plainly erred in instructing the jury on the elements of the “offense” clause under § 371 instead of the “defraud” clause. The trial court also plainly erred when it limited the advice of counsel instruction to the substantive count and instructed the jury that advice of counsel was not a defense to the conspiracy count.

Officers who found meth in a storage unit after “peeking” inside the unit violated the Fourth Amendment. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized from a subsequent search of the unit and the defendant’s home pursuant to search warrants that the officers obtained using information from their earlier, warrantless search of the unit.

Narrowing Congress’s ability to criminalize intrastate conduct through the Commerce Clause, the Eighth Circuit held that a defendant’s intrastate use of a car and payment of U.S. currency in connection with soliciting sex from a minor were insufficient to satisfy the commerce element in 18 USC § 1591.

In a rare challenge to Congress’s power under Thirteenth Amendment, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the conviction of Jordan Leahy under 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B) for racially motivated violent interference with another’s use of a public road. The Court held that § 245(b)(2)(B) is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s authority under the Thirteenth Amendment, and rejected challenges to the jury instructions, the handling of jury questions, and the sufficiency of the evidence. Here, there was amply evidence that the defendant was motivated by the victim’s race and use of the road.

The Third Circuit vacated Josey’s sentence for failing to update his sex-offender registration after moving interstate, holding that the district court erred in counting defendant’s prior sentences that were imposed over ten years prior to the “commencement of the instant offense.” The court held that the district court could not rely on the commentary to the Guidelines to begin counting the 10-year period from the date of the defendant’s relevant conduct, here a separate sentence for failure to register under state law, and instead had to count the 10-year period only from the specific offense of conviction.

The Seventh Circuit upheld Illinois’s ban on guns in public transit under Bruen, finding it consistent with a historical tradition of restricting firearms in sensitive, crowded places. The court emphasized characteristics of the ban supporting application of the “sensitive places doctrine,” such as the density of the place, the presence of vulnerable populations (namely, children), the furthering of important societal interests, and government control of the space.

The Second Circuit affirmed convictions of a veterinarian and salesperson for manufacturing and distributing undetectable performance-enhancing drugs to racehorse trainers, rejecting arguments that the FDCA’s enhanced penalty provision applies only to fraud against consumers. The court also held that FDCA seizure provisions do not authorize criminal forfeiture and vacated the $25 million restitution and forfeiture orders.