Eleventh Circuit

The Court affirmed the district court’s denial of the defendant’s second § 2255 motion, holding that the defendant’s federal second-degree murder offenses, based on pointing a firearm at boat passengers and throwing them overboard, was a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)’s residual and elements clause.

The Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction for possessing unauthorized access devices affecting interstate commerce, holding that the district court retained jurisdiction despite the guilty plea lacking a factual basis explaining how the defendant’s conduct affected interstate commerce. A district court’s jurisdiction is invoked by an indictment sufficiently alleging a federal offense, while an offense’s “jurisdictional element” only reflects Congress’s power to regulate or prohibit the conduct at issue.

The Court affirmed a restitution order under § 2259 as to 8 of 9 child pornography victims, holding that the district court was not required to disaggregate the victims’ losses among the abusers, producers, distributors, and possessors of the images before determining an individual defendant’s restitution obligation. The Court held that the court sufficiently considered proximate causation and the defendant’s relative role as a possessor. The Court also held that one victim had not provided any evidence regarding her losses or the defendant’s causal relationship to those losses.

The Court affirmed the defendant’s sentence for child pornography after his offense level was enhanced based on his distribution of child pornography while he was in Jamaica. The Court held that a sentencing court may properly consider extraterritorial conduct if it is otherwise relevant conduct under the Guidelines.

The Court held that the defendant had waived his right to appeal through his plea agreement with the Government despite the Government joining his objection to the district court that the sentence imposed was unreasonable.

Citing other circuits, the Eleventh Circuit held for the first time that the application of § 4B1.5(b)(1) does not require multiple victims and can be applied to a defendant who engages in a pattern of prohibited sexual conduct with the same minor.

Sixth Amendment/Confrontation Clause – There was no confrontation clause violation when law enforcement agent testified that the victims refused to testify because they feared humiliation since their statements regarding why they would not testify were not testimonial. However, the mens’ reasons for visiting the defendant’s apartment were testimonial statements since they were made in response […]

The Court held that a police officer did not exceed the scope of a permissible Terry frisk by reaching into the defendant’s pocket and seizing ammunition and a holster after feeling the bullet during the frisk. Under the totality of circumstances, going into the defendant’s pocket and removing ammunition was reasonably related to the protection of law enforcement.

The Court affirmed the defendants’ convictions and sentences, holding that 1) the statute of limitations did not bar prosecution since subsequent DNA testing implicated the defendant, 2) a non-testifying co-defendant’s hearsay statements implicating the defendant were admissible as non-testimonial since the co-defendant had no reason to believe the statements would serve as a substitute for testimony, 3) there were no evidentiary errors and the evidence was sufficient to convict, 4) the prosecutor’s comment in closing that there was no other explanation for defendants’ DNA at the crime scene was not a comment on the defendant’s decision not to testify, and 5) the sentencing court properly applied an enhancement for “using” a weapon.

Reviewing a petitioner’s § 2254 motion, the Court held that the state court’s rejection of petitioner’s ineffective claim was objectively reasonable since trial counsel’s decision to refrain from presenting certain mitigation evidence at death penalty sentencing was a strategic decision. The Court also held that the state court did not go against clearly established federal law in holding that the trial court did not err in requiring defendant to wear a stun belt under his clothes because the Supreme Court has only established that requiring visible restraints is prejudicial.