Eleventh Circuit

The Court affirmed the defendants’ convictions, holding, among other things, that there was probable cause to justify warrantless search of the defendant’s vehicle where officers could tie the vehicle to identity fraud, the defendant’s repeated use of an access device to obtain benefits reflected knowledge that the access device belonged to a real person, the government was allowed to use a detective as an expert witness on common slang terms in identity fraud cases, and the district court properly applied a firearm enhancement.

The Court denied the petitioner’s request for a rehearing en banc, leaving in place the rule in In re Griffin that provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines cannot be challenged as void-for-vagueness and that the Supreme Court’s rule in Johnson is not retroactively applicable to career-offender sentences imposed either under the advisory or mandatory version of the Guidelines.

The Court dismissed the defendant’s appeal, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to review an order dismissing the indictment against the defendant. Even though the order was explicitly based on the government’s promise to dismiss charges in exchange for the defendant’s agreement to leave the U.S. for ten years, the order itself did not impose those terms on the defendant or create a legal interest that would give him standing to appeal the order.

The Court affirmed application of the enhancement for an offense involving a firearm “capable of accepting a large capacity magazine” where the firearm in question was in “close proximity” to a high capacity magazine as measured by its physical distance and accessibility.

The Court vacated the defendant’s sentence for identity fraud after holding that the sentencing court improperly enhanced the defendant’s offense level because it counted as victims individuals whose means of identification were stolen but not “used.” The Court affirmed the district court’s loss amount, holding that defendant did not present an argument establishing plain error.

The Court held that the district court erred in dismissing the petitioner’s § 2254 motion as untimely after he filed a defective postconviction motion in state court. The Court held that the petitioner’s amended motion related back to the original filing, thus tolling the AEDPA’s statute of limitations from the time of the original filing until the amended motion was denied with prejudice.

The Court held that there is no “innocent transitory possession” defense to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The purposes and duration of a defendant’s possession of a firearm are irrelevant since § 922(g) is a general intent crime.

The Court vacated the defendant’s sentence after holding that a prior conviction under Georgia’s aggravated assault statute is not a “crime of violence” under the ACCA or Federal Sentencing Guidelines when the conviction is based on a simple assault with a mens rea of recklessness.

The Court held that a warrantless search of a boarded-up crawlspace in the defendant’s house was reasonable based on exigent circumstances indicating there may have been hostages in the crawlspace. Officers had just arrested the defendant after a stand-off that included hostages and during which officers heard the defendant using a power drill and were informed that the defendant was hiding something in the crawlspace.

The Court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the district court’s denial of a § 2254 petitioner’s motions for substitute counsel. The orders were not final orders under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and did not fall under the collateral order doctrine since orders could be reviewed in an appeal from a denial of the petitioner’s §2254 motion.