Eleventh Circuit

The Court held that the district court erred in dismissing the petitioner’s § 2254 motion as untimely after he filed a defective postconviction motion in state court. The Court held that the petitioner’s amended motion related back to the original filing, thus tolling the AEDPA’s statute of limitations from the time of the original filing until the amended motion was denied with prejudice.

The Court held that there is no “innocent transitory possession” defense to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The purposes and duration of a defendant’s possession of a firearm are irrelevant since § 922(g) is a general intent crime.

The Court vacated the defendant’s sentence after holding that a prior conviction under Georgia’s aggravated assault statute is not a “crime of violence” under the ACCA or Federal Sentencing Guidelines when the conviction is based on a simple assault with a mens rea of recklessness.

The Court held that a warrantless search of a boarded-up crawlspace in the defendant’s house was reasonable based on exigent circumstances indicating there may have been hostages in the crawlspace. Officers had just arrested the defendant after a stand-off that included hostages and during which officers heard the defendant using a power drill and were informed that the defendant was hiding something in the crawlspace.

The Court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the district court’s denial of a § 2254 petitioner’s motions for substitute counsel. The orders were not final orders under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and did not fall under the collateral order doctrine since orders could be reviewed in an appeal from a denial of the petitioner’s §2254 motion.

A majority of the Court voted against granting a rehearing en banc. The Court produced three dissents and three opinions concurring in the decision to deny granting a rehearing en banc. This decision leaves in place the prior panel opinion regarding the ACCA and the binding authority of prior panel orders on Section 2255 petitions as applied to future, non-2255 cases.

The Court affirmed the denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress finding that the traffic stop leading to the search and seizure of the defendant’s firearm was reasonable despite the officers arriving with their guns drawn and the fact that the defendant was not the driver or otherwise suspected of any criminal activity. The defendant’s brief detention was reasonable given his proximity to the car and driver, and the officers drawing their guns did not affect the legality of the stop.

The Court affirmed the defendant’s sentence as a “career offender” under § 4B1.1 of the Guidelines after finding that the defendant’s prior Florida conviction for battery was a “crime of violence” pursuant to the modified categorical approach.

The Court held that circumstantial evidence including the defendant’s criminal history, his signature on the storage unit lease, and his access to the storage unit was sufficient to prove he constructively possessed the controlled substances found within the storage unit.

The Court held that a pro se defendant’s Notice of Appeal was insufficient under Rule 3(c)(1) where the evidence reflected the defendant’s intention to file a collateral attack instead. The defendant’s notice failed to name a court of appeals or grounds for appeal, she signed a statement declining to pursue an appeal, and she sought to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, one of the few claims not waived by her plea agreement.