Circuit Court Opinions

The Court affirmed the defendants’ convictions and sentences, holding that 1) the statute of limitations did not bar prosecution since subsequent DNA testing implicated the defendant, 2) a non-testifying co-defendant’s hearsay statements implicating the defendant were admissible as non-testimonial since the co-defendant had no reason to believe the statements would serve as a substitute for testimony, 3) there were no evidentiary errors and the evidence was sufficient to convict, 4) the prosecutor’s comment in closing that there was no other explanation for defendants’ DNA at the crime scene was not a comment on the defendant’s decision not to testify, and 5) the sentencing court properly applied an enhancement for “using” a weapon.

Reviewing a petitioner’s § 2254 motion, the Court held that the state court’s rejection of petitioner’s ineffective claim was objectively reasonable since trial counsel’s decision to refrain from presenting certain mitigation evidence at death penalty sentencing was a strategic decision. The Court also held that the state court did not go against clearly established federal law in holding that the trial court did not err in requiring defendant to wear a stun belt under his clothes because the Supreme Court has only established that requiring visible restraints is prejudicial.

The Court affirmed the defendants’ convictions, holding, among other things, that there was probable cause to justify warrantless search of the defendant’s vehicle where officers could tie the vehicle to identity fraud, the defendant’s repeated use of an access device to obtain benefits reflected knowledge that the access device belonged to a real person, the government was allowed to use a detective as an expert witness on common slang terms in identity fraud cases, and the district court properly applied a firearm enhancement.

The Court denied the petitioner’s request for a rehearing en banc, leaving in place the rule in In re Griffin that provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines cannot be challenged as void-for-vagueness and that the Supreme Court’s rule in Johnson is not retroactively applicable to career-offender sentences imposed either under the advisory or mandatory version of the Guidelines.

The Court dismissed the defendant’s appeal, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to review an order dismissing the indictment against the defendant. Even though the order was explicitly based on the government’s promise to dismiss charges in exchange for the defendant’s agreement to leave the U.S. for ten years, the order itself did not impose those terms on the defendant or create a legal interest that would give him standing to appeal the order.

The Court affirmed application of the enhancement for an offense involving a firearm “capable of accepting a large capacity magazine” where the firearm in question was in “close proximity” to a high capacity magazine as measured by its physical distance and accessibility.

The Court vacated the defendant’s sentence for identity fraud after holding that the sentencing court improperly enhanced the defendant’s offense level because it counted as victims individuals whose means of identification were stolen but not “used.” The Court affirmed the district court’s loss amount, holding that defendant did not present an argument establishing plain error.

The Court held that the district court erred in dismissing the petitioner’s § 2254 motion as untimely after he filed a defective postconviction motion in state court. The Court held that the petitioner’s amended motion related back to the original filing, thus tolling the AEDPA’s statute of limitations from the time of the original filing until the amended motion was denied with prejudice.

The Court held that there is no “innocent transitory possession” defense to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The purposes and duration of a defendant’s possession of a firearm are irrelevant since § 922(g) is a general intent crime.

The Court vacated the defendant’s sentence after holding that a prior conviction under Georgia’s aggravated assault statute is not a “crime of violence” under the ACCA or Federal Sentencing Guidelines when the conviction is based on a simple assault with a mens rea of recklessness.