Drug Offenses

After bouncing between the Third Circuit and the Supreme Court, including after an en banc decision, the Third Circuit affirmed the defendant’s conviction but remanded for resentencing, reaffirming its holding that the defendant was not a career offender based on his prior state law convictions, since “the plain language of the guidelines does not include inchoate “attempt” drug crimes like the one that was used as one of Nasir’s predicate offenses.”

The First Circuit reversed a district court’s order denying defendant’s motion to vacate sentence and conviction under 28 USC 2255. The defendant’s appellate attorney had been ineffective for failure to raise a Brady claim, raised by all of her co-defendants on appeal, based on the government’s failure to disclose material that would have undermined the government witnesses’ credibility. The First Circuit held that “any reasonable attorney would have known of the availability of the Brady claim since the co-defendants all raised it and since trial counsel had preserved the issue by raising it in his motion for new trial.”

The Fifth Circuit vacated a defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing based on the district court’s erroneous application of the firearm enhancement under USSG 2D1.1(b)(1). The PSR did not include sufficient facts to establish a temporal and spatial relationship between the defendant, the gun, and the drug trafficking activity. The defendant was not shown to have any connection to or knowledge of the gun, and the district court failed to make a record of what its rationale may have been supporting the enhancement.

The Seventh Circuit reversed a defendant’s drug conspiracy conviction and substantive conviction for distributing drugs. The Court held that the evidence equally supported a finding that the defendant was in a buyer-seller relationship with a DTO rather than a co-conspirator. The Court also held that there was insufficient evidence that the defendant constructively possessed meth found at his acquaintance’s house.

On remand from the Eleventh Circuit’s en banc holding, the Court held that the district court erred in suppressing evidence where the government proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the incriminating evidence would have been discussed through lawful means despite the violation of the defendant’s rights. The agents had been contemplating a knock and talk, which would have revealed to them the incriminating drug evidence, and it was not controlling that they had discussed this tactic after the constitutional violation.

The Eighth Circuit affirmed a defendant’s conviction after he challenged an officer’s warrantless search of his rental car during a traffic stop. The Court held that the officer did not unlawfully prolong the traffic stop where reasonable suspicion existed to extend the stop based on the incongruity between the defendant’s stated travel plans and his rental car agreement, inconsistencies in the defendant’s travel history, the disparity between the cost of flying versus renting a car, and the defendant’s emphasis on his military background in response to questioning. Moreover, despite the officer initially commanding the defendant to open his trunk and let him search his luggage, the Court held the defendant’s consent was voluntary where the officer subsequently confirmed he had permission and the circumstances showed the officer was not acting authoritatively or in a confrontational manner.

The Tenth Circuit affirmed a defendant’s conviction despite finding that the district court violated Rule 605 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which prohibits judges from testifying as witnesses. After the defendant had testified that there had been a second video, not shown to the jury, which would have shown the government’s video was manufactured, the district judge instructed the jury that there was only one video in the case. While this clearly violated Rule 605, the Court concluded that the violation was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed a defendant’s conviction and sentence. The Court held that the district court did not err in using the future-tense in instructing the jury on the elements of RICO, since the conspiracy charge criminalized the agreement to form a racketeering enterprise, even if the enterprise has not been formed yet. The Court also affirmed the two-level enhancement for maintaining a premise for drug distribution, holding that the defendant could be held accountable for a co-defendant’s maintenance of a premise that was part of a jointly undertaken criminal activity.

The Second Circuit vacated a defendant’s conviction for distributing fentanyl. The Court held that the defendant only has to present “some credible evidence” regarding government inducement in order to obtain an instruction on entrapment. The Government’s law enforcement witness also improperly testified that the defendant was an experienced drug dealer, which required specialized knowledge.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence from a traffic stop. The Court held that the officer’s mistaken interpretation of Alabama traffic law was reasonable, the officer did not unlawfully prolong the stop by asking the driver about his plans and itinerary or allowing his dog to sniff near the car, and there was probable cause to search the vehicle based on the dog’s change in behavior near the car, though the dog did not give a “final response” indicating the presence of drugs.