Firearm Offenses

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant for the defendant’s girlfriend’s home. The Court reasoned that the search warrant affidavit, which merely alleged that the defendant had brandished a gun at a Waffle House and was at his girlfriend’s apartment on another date, was “bare bones,” “rested on little more than conjecture,” and amounted to “a hunch dressed in paperwork.” Notably, the Court further held that the affidavit was so lacking in probable cause that the good faith exception did not apply.

The Tenth Circuit reversed a district court’s dismissal of an indictment charging a defendant with possession of a firearm as an unlawful drug user. Applying the Supreme Court’s refined standard for Second Amendment claims under Rahimi, the Court remanded for further fact-finding by the district court to determine whether non-intoxicated marijuana users, like the defendant, pose a sufficient risk of future danger so as to justify 18 USC 922(g)(3).

In a 7-2 opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed a § 924(c) conviction, holding that state murder statutes encompassing omissions or a failure to act necessarily involve the “use of physical force” within the meaning of the statute.

In a 6-3 opinion, the majority reinforced that a petitioner cannot file a second or subsequent motion to vacate a sentence under 28 USC 2255 unless they can show “newly discovered evidence” or a “new rule of constitutional law.” Even though a majority of circuits had held that the “savings clause” under 2255(e) creates an additional exception when the available options are “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention,” the Court held that this exception did not apply to second or subsequent motions.

At issue was whether the sentencing court erred in holding that it 924(c) deprived it of discretion to run Lora’s two sentences concurrently for drug trafficking and violating 924(j). In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court held that 924(j) and 924(c) set forth different offenses with different sentencing provisions. Since courts otherwise have discretion to run sentences concurrently or consecutively, the sentencing court erred in finding that it was bound by 924(c) in imposing a sentence for a violation of 924(j).

In yet another blow to 18 U.S.C. 922(g), the statute prohibiting certain categories of people from possessing, a district court in Texas has struck down 922(g)(3) as unconstitutional under the Supreme Court’s decision last year in Bruen. Section 922(g)(3) prohibits “unlawful users” of controlled substances from possessing firearms. After a detailed analysis, the district court found there was no history or tradition criminalizing the mere possession of firearms by unlawful drug users.

Since the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in New York State Rifle v. Bruen, where the Court held that firearm regulations must be consistent with firearm regulations as they existed at the time of the Constitution’s ratification, district courts across the country have applied the new framework in Bruen to strike down several criminal firearm statutes as unconstitutional. Most recently, courts have struck down federal statutes prohibiting possession of firearms with obliterated or altered serial numbers, possession of a firearm by a person under indictment, and possession of a firearm by a person subject to a domestic restraining order.

The Fourth Circuit vacated a defendant’s conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The Court held that the defendant met his burden of showing a Rehaif error where there was evidence that he did not know he was a felon given that he was sentenced to 6 months probation for possession of cocaine under South Carolina and the record showed he genuinely did not know he was a felon.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district court’s denial of a defendant’s motion under 28 USC 2255. The Court held that the defendant’s motion was properly waived based on his plea agreement, notwithstanding changes in the law that undermined his conviction under 924(c), holding that the waiver exception for sentences over the statutory maximum is based on the maximum “in effect at the time of sentencing,” and not the maximum based on subsequent new laws.

The Fourth Circuit reversed the denial of a defendant’s motion under 28 USC 2255 where the defendant challenged his conviction and sentence under 924(c). The Court concluded that the underlying offense for the 924(c) charge, damaging government property under 18 USC 1361, was not a “crime of violence.”