Sentencing

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a motion for sentence reduction under 18 USC 3582(c)(1)(A), holding that the district court did not err in finding that, assuming the defendant had established extraordinary and compelling reasons outside of USSG 1B1.13, his release was not warranted under the 18 USC 3553(a) factors.

The Eleventh Circuit upheld a sentencing guideline enhancement for possessing a firearm under § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) because the evidence showed that the defendant planned on selling the firearm to purchase drugs he intended to distribute.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the defendant’s sentence, holding that the district court properly estimated the loss amount based on specific, circumstantial evidence of causation, namely that the defendant’s investors relied on the defendant’s fraudulent representations, and that the court did not err in rejecting the defendant’s intervening causation theory. The Court also held that the defendant’s claims on remand before the district court where limited by the scope fo the appellate court’s mandate on remand and did not fall under any of the three exceptions.

The Ninth Circuit reversed one of the defendant’s assault convictions and corresponding § 924(c) convictions as multiplicitous because the defendant, although charged with shooting at five officers, only shot at them four times. The Court also held that multiple shots fired in quick succession do not necessarily mean the firearm was only used once under 924(c).

The Sixth Circuit vacated the defendant’s sentence for drug conspiracy and remanded it to the sentencing court after the court held the defendant accountable for a higher drug quantity than the jury did at trial, which the defendant argued violated his Sixth Amendment claim. The court held that the sentencing court did not adequately explain its reasoning, so it could not review the constitutionality of the defendant’s claim.

The Court held that defendants who pleaded guilty and had their pleas accepted before enactment of the First Step Act were not eligible for expanded safety-valve relief under the First Step Act, even if they were sentenced after the Act was enacted.

The district court is not required to hold a hearing prior to reducing a defendant’s sentence under the First Step Act’s retroactive penalties for crack-cocaine.

The Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction for unlawfully transporting technology to Cuba without a license, holding that there was sufficient evidence that he knew his conduct was unlawful given repeated warnings he received regarding the export license requirement. The Court also held that the trial court adequately conveyed the substance of the defendant’s proposoed instruction on ignorance of the law while it did not recite it verbatim and that the defendant’s sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice was warranted given his perjured testimony at trial.

The Court affirmed the defendant’s sentence, holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the Court to weigh the defendant’s history and offense over his post-offense rehabilitation.

The Court held that the district court did not err in refusing to consider the defendant’s untimely motion to suppress, since the defendant’s failure was based on a strategic decision. Moreover, the sentencing court did not err in refusing to grant a downward departure for acceptance of responsibility where the defendant challenge his factual guilt throughout the proceedings and at trial.