Eleventh Circuit

In a case involving mail fraud and falsifying immigration forms, the Court held that the district court correctly applied the Guidelines for fraud under 2B1.1 rather than for falsifying immigration forms under 2L2.1, explaining that “the heart” of the defendant’s scheme was enriching themselves by cheating undocumented immigrants.

The Court held that selling body armor is not sufficient to warrant an enhancement for “using” body armor under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.5, which enhances a defendant’s offense level if the defendant used body armor though “active employment in a manner to protect the person from gunfire” or “as a means of bartering.” The Court held that the definition of bartering applies to trading goods without the use of money.

Among other rulings on other issues, the Court reversed the defendant’s conviction for bankruptcy fraud, holding that the income from his second religious temple, opened after the first temple filed a petition for bankruptcy and providing the same services as the first temple, did not constitute post-petition property of the first temple’s estate since the temples otherwise operated as two separate entities and the government did not try to pierce the corporate veil.

The Court affirmed the defendant’s convictions for enticing a minor under § 2422(b) but reversed his conviction under § 373 for solicitation to commit a crime of violence, holding that kidnapping under § 1201(a) is not a “crime of violence” under the categorical approach applicable to § 373. The Court also held that the defendant’s right to a complete defense was not violated by the trial court’s proper rulings on the inadmissibility of the defense experts’ testimony.

The Court affirmed the defendant’s convictions for wire fraud, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting proposed jury instructions that distinguished a “scheme to defraud” from a “scheme to deceive,” since the proposed instructions did not also include language defining an intent to harm based on a misrepresentation of the nature of the bargain.

The Court held that the district court did not err by allowing the Government to withdraw its Rule 35 motion, as the plea agreement giving the Government discretion to file a motion for a sentence reduction also gave the Government discretion to later withdraw such a motion.

The Court affirmed the defendant’s sentence under the ACCA, holding that a Florida conviction for aiding and abetting an armed robbery counts as a “violent felony” for purposes of sentencing a defendant under the ACCA since an aider and abettor is liable as a principal under Florida law.

The Court affirmed the defendant’s sentence. The district court did not err by holding that the Guidelines recommend consecutive maximum sentences for each count of conviction where the Guidelines range (life imprisonment) exceeds the statutory maximum for each count.

The Court held that officers’ warrantless two-day seizure of the defendant’s cell phone, based on evidence the defendant had sexually exploited a minor, was not permissible under Terry but was justified by probable cause and exigent circumstances. The Court also held that the sentencing court did not engage in double-counting by enhancing the defendant’s offense level for conduct involving a visual depiction of sexual acts and engaging in a pattern of prohibited sexual activities.

The Court affirmed the district court’s denial of the defendant’s habeas petition under § 2254. The defendant failed to show that the state court’s denial of Atkins claim of ineligibility for the death penalty due to intellectual disability or denial of his Batson claim were contrary to clearly established law or constituted an unreasonable determination of the facts. The Court also held that the requirement in Moore v. Texas that state courts consider prevailing medical standards in adjudicating Atkins claims was not retroactive under Teague.