Eleventh Circuit

Where the defendants stole and later destroyed a rare gold bar recovered from a sunken treasure ship, the Court held that in cases involving a unique item or an item that has no market for it, the proper figure to calculate restitution is the “replacement cost” of the item rather than its mere fair market value, which in this case would have been the bar’s weight in gold. However, the district court erred in adopting the victim-museum’s arbitrarily defined value of the gold bar for restitution purposes.

Joining several other circuits, the Eleventh Circuit held that a conviction for Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a “crime of violence” for the sentencing enhancement under either the elements clause of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) or as an enumerated robbery or extortion offense, as a defendant can be convicted of Hobbs Act robbery based merely on a threat to property.

In a case involving mail fraud and falsifying immigration forms, the Court held that the district court correctly applied the Guidelines for fraud under 2B1.1 rather than for falsifying immigration forms under 2L2.1, explaining that “the heart” of the defendant’s scheme was enriching themselves by cheating undocumented immigrants.

The Court held that selling body armor is not sufficient to warrant an enhancement for “using” body armor under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.5, which enhances a defendant’s offense level if the defendant used body armor though “active employment in a manner to protect the person from gunfire” or “as a means of bartering.” The Court held that the definition of bartering applies to trading goods without the use of money.

Among other rulings on other issues, the Court reversed the defendant’s conviction for bankruptcy fraud, holding that the income from his second religious temple, opened after the first temple filed a petition for bankruptcy and providing the same services as the first temple, did not constitute post-petition property of the first temple’s estate since the temples otherwise operated as two separate entities and the government did not try to pierce the corporate veil.

The Court affirmed the defendant’s convictions for enticing a minor under § 2422(b) but reversed his conviction under § 373 for solicitation to commit a crime of violence, holding that kidnapping under § 1201(a) is not a “crime of violence” under the categorical approach applicable to § 373. The Court also held that the defendant’s right to a complete defense was not violated by the trial court’s proper rulings on the inadmissibility of the defense experts’ testimony.

The Court affirmed the defendant’s convictions for wire fraud, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting proposed jury instructions that distinguished a “scheme to defraud” from a “scheme to deceive,” since the proposed instructions did not also include language defining an intent to harm based on a misrepresentation of the nature of the bargain.

The Court held that the district court did not err by allowing the Government to withdraw its Rule 35 motion, as the plea agreement giving the Government discretion to file a motion for a sentence reduction also gave the Government discretion to later withdraw such a motion.

The Court affirmed the defendant’s sentence under the ACCA, holding that a Florida conviction for aiding and abetting an armed robbery counts as a “violent felony” for purposes of sentencing a defendant under the ACCA since an aider and abettor is liable as a principal under Florida law.

The Court affirmed the defendant’s sentence. The district court did not err by holding that the Guidelines recommend consecutive maximum sentences for each count of conviction where the Guidelines range (life imprisonment) exceeds the statutory maximum for each count.